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ABSTRACT 
A frame transition problem exists between project Systems Engineers (SE) and 
Department of Defense (DoD) Program Managers (PM). Systems engineering 
organizations, operating in a rational frame, must produce systems engineering 
documents required for the PM operating in a political frame of constrained resources. 
These artifacts, required for milestone reviews, are the results of extensive technical 
effort that must be accounted for and adequately resourced during project planning by the 
PM. Programs cannot progress through the DoD acquisition framework if these statutory 
and regulatory documents are not completed on time and of acceptable technical quality, 
which is determined during a complicated multi-organization review process. By 
providing the PM and DoD decision makers with a quantified risk assessment 
methodology during project planning, these key artifacts can be included in initial 
program risk assessment activities. This thesis provides the methodology for developing a 
comprehensive risk model for DoD milestone documentation as well as recommended 
changes to the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Project Planning and Risk 
Management process areas. The intent is to use risk as the common ground between the 
DoD PM and SE so that each can operate within their respective environments with a 
common and consistent understanding of risk.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Department of Defense (DoD) systems are acquired under Cost As an 
Independent Variable (CAIV) principles. The PM, who operate under this construct, in a 
resource constrained environment, typically react to this in the planning phase by either 
bypassing or partially resourcing the cost and schedule for technical activities that do not 
appear to tie directly to product development. These program management decisions are 
typically made without engineers clearly communicating the risks to the program 
introduced by these actions. 
The result can be that key technical artifacts, required for milestone decisions, are 
neither of sufficient technical quality nor completed on time, thereby placing the 
milestone at risk. An example of a required document that is typically not fully resourced 
is the Information Support Plan (ISP). Fully resourced means not only the initial 
document creation but also the entire complex, dynamic, and iterative set of activities that 
are required to gain document approval are resourced by the PM.  
Engineering products/activities have a better chance of being resourced if they 
can be represented as project risk (if X resources are not provided, then the PM must 
accept Y risk). The Systems Engineering process models do indeed include specific and 
generic practices for risk management and planning. The process models do not, 
however, provide a methodology for translating the engineering work into a 
comprehensive risk relationship (technical, program management, review process) that 
the PM can identify with and fund in the project planning phase. When projects are 
poorly planned, resources are not available, or only applied when needed, and are applied 





This research provides a quantitative risk methodology for DoD statutory and 
regulatory required technical documentation that facilitates technical and program 
management organization communications during the project planning phase as a means 
to either ensure key technical work is adequately resourced or require the PM to accept 
the risks. Recommended changes to the Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI) 
risk management and project planning processes are also provided. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
NASA, in its “Value of Systems Engineering; Summary report 1/04” (Werner 
Gruhl, 2004), concludes that systems engineering must make up 15% of the total project 
estimate or the program will have overruns (Figure 1). Given that, why does the PM not 
simply fund the cost of a product plus 15 percent? The problem is that the SE and the PM 
operate in different frames (Bohlman & Deal, 1997). Engineers operate in a rational or 
structural frame, while the PM makes decisions in a resource constrained political frame. 
The PM simply cannot “fund systems engineering.” A better approach is needed to tie the 
technical, programmatic, and organizational aspects of the program together so that the 
PM can make better decisions enabled from a multi-frame perspective, or enabled by 
providing information that can be understood in the political frame. That common ground 
is risk. 
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Figure 1.   Value of Systems Engineering (From: Werner Gruhl, 2004) 
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With a view of the project dominated by the political frame, the PM either defers 
or partially resources technical activities that do not appear to tie directly to product 
development. These program management decisions are typically made because 
engineers do not present their cost and schedule estimates during the planning phase in 
terms of risk. The result can be that key technical artifacts, required by statute or 
regulation for milestone decisions, are neither of sufficient technical quality nor on time. 
Systems Engineering Plans (SEP) and Information Support Plans (ISP) are examples of 
statutory and regulatory required documents that are typically not fully resourced, yet 
necessary to decompose design and development activities to a level of detail required for 
successful acquisition. In this case, fully resourced means not only the initial document(s) 
creation but also the entire complex, dynamic, and iterative set of activities required to 
gain approval, execute, and manage the SEP and the ISP. The only way these and like 
systems engineering products/activities stand a chance of becoming fully resourced is if 
they can be translated from effort to project risk. 
The Systems Engineering process models do indeed include specific and generic 
practices for risk management and planning. The process models do not, however, 
provide a methodology for translating the engineering work into a defined risk 
relationship (cost, schedule, performance) that the PM can identify with and fund in the 
project planning phase. When programs are poorly planned, resources are not available or 
applied when needed. 
The Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) is a process improvement 
maturity model for the development of products and services. The CMMI clearly 
identifies process improvement goals, partitions the model in process areas that are 
intuitive and manageable, defines process flow/relationships, and identifies the practices 
to be performed in each process area.  
The project planning process area has three specific goals: 1) establish estimates, 
2) develop a project plan, and 3) obtain commitment to plan. The typical dynamic 
between the PM and the SE during the estimating activities of projecting planning are a 
series of discussions/negotiations on “how much” engineering to fund. Estimates are 
integrated, with Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) influences, into the overall 
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project plan. However, because these estimates for engineering work products are not 
integrated into the project plan as risk, both historically and certainly those estimates are 
the first “CAIV victims” of the PM, putting the milestone at risk.  
B. PURPOSE 
This research explores the causes for under resourcing systems engineering 
documents required for progressing through the DoD acquisition framework. A key part 
of this research is to understand the reframing needed to support the PM’s political 
decision-making process. While focusing on the ISP, this research identifies the 
probability of success curves for key statutory and regulatory systems engineering 
documentation to be considered during project planning, as well as identify changes to 
the CMMI project planning and risk management process areas for inclusion of risk 
quantification of systems engineering documents.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Systems engineering documentation, required to support system maturity 
assessments at milestone decisions, are artifacts that capture years of significant technical 
effort. With some either required by statute and/or DoD regulation, the program cannot 
progress through the DoD acquisition framework without them. The following questions 
were designed to understand the risks of under resourced systems engineering 
documentation on a DoD acquisition program and identify the shortfalls in the CMMI 
process model regarding risk quantification. 
 Can the risk to a required DoD systems engineering document be 
quantified? 
 Does the quantification of risk support the transition from the rational to 
the political frame during project planning?  
 What changes to the CMMI Project Planning Area should be considered? 
 What changes to the CMMI Risk Management Area should be 
considered? 
 Does inclusion of risk quantification into key systems engineering 
documents during project planning phase improve probability of DoD 
program success? 
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D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The combination of the complexity of DoD weapon systems and information 
technology (IT) systems, and the requirement (statutory and regulatory) to demonstrate 
program maturity at milestone review events in the acquisition framework places systems 
engineering documentation at the same level of importance as the system under 
development. The system cannot move forward through the acquisition framework, 
regardless of physical system maturity, without the supporting technical design 
documentation.  
From a war-fighting perspective, needed capability cannot be delivered from the 
acquisition community when technical documentation, some required for certification 
and/or accreditation, have delayed the development and fielding process. The delay to the 
warfighter can also occur for the fielding of modifications or additional increments of 
capability to already deployed systems as they are also subjected to the DoD acquisition 
framework, statutory and regulatory requirements, and certification and accreditation 
requirements.  
By providing the PM, and indirectly, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), 
with a quantified and comprehensive (technical, programmatic, and review process) risk 
assessment for required systems engineering documents, better decisions can be made 
during project planning and risk management activities. This risk model is built with the 
understanding and acceptance that the SE and the PM view the program from differing 
perspectives, driven by the environments in which they must operate. By using risk as 
common ground, more informed decisions can be made by both, and subsequently, a 
better chance of achieving project success, which must always be accepted as nothing 
less than delivery of capability to the warfighter.  
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will provide a comprehensive risk model for quantifying the risk of 
key systems engineering documentation required for DoD systems to progress through 
the acquisition framework as well as identify changes to the CMMI process improvement 
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maturity model since this process model has a history of application to DoD weapon 
system development. The intent is to use risk as the common ground between the DoD 
PM and SE so that each can operate within their respective environments with a common 
and consistent understanding of risk. 
Both previous and current USMC ISP efforts are reviewed as well as process 
owner and subject matter expert interviews to understand both the existence and the 
severity of the problem of ISP development. 
The risk model is developed around perhaps the most complex required 
document, the ISP. The ISP is a regulatory requirement (DODI 5000.2, December 2008) 
developed, matured and maintained from program initiation, through fielding and 
operations/sustainment. Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) 
architecture view development, document development, and review activities are 
modeled in a comprehensive network diagram with a cumulative probability distribution 
function (PDF) generated. 
The generation of a cumulative PDF is not effective alone. Information must be 
supportive of the PM’s decision-making process in the resource constrained political 
environment. To address this key human component, organization framing theory 
(Bohlman & Deal, 1997) is explored to understand the PM’s decision-making process. 
With DoD’s history of applying the CMMI process improvement framework, the 
project planning and risk management areas of the CMMI is explored to identify areas for 
quantification of systems engineering documentation. By implementing changes in the 
CMMI, both the DoD PM and DoD industry partners can benefit.  
Chapter II discusses the statutory and regulatory requirements for systems 
engineering documentation in DoD acquisition and their role in decision making. Next, 
the premise for the need to manage the risk of systems engineering documentation is set 
by analyzing the risk areas of the ISP. 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DOCUMENTATION RISK IN DOD 
ACQUISITION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Systems Engineering documentation developed as part of the DoD acquisition 
framework (DODI 5000.2, December 2008) are artifacts that capture extensive technical 
work. These documents are developed and maintained throughout the acquisition 
lifecycle and are key parts of the decision-making process for progression through the 
acquisition framework. Required at milestone reviews for determining systems maturity, 
these documents not only require significant resources to develop, but must undergo an 
extensive review process through the PM, Program Executive Office (PEO), Service 
Acquisition Executive (SAE), Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
organizations prior to obtaining approval, subsequently meeting milestone entrance 
criteria. With these complexities and importance to program progress, risk must be 
managed throughout the entire development and review process. 
This chapter sets the premise for the need to manage the risk of systems 
engineering documentation. The requirements for, and dependencies on, the ISP in the 
DoD acquisition framework and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 
(CJCSI) are identified so that a need to manage the risk of this documentation becomes 
clear. The ISP is the key systems engineering artifact addressed.  
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS IN 
CJCSI 3170.1G, DODI 5000.2, AND CJCSI 6212.01E 
The war-fighting need or capability for the acquisition community to acquire a 
weapon system or IT system is determined through the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) process as directed in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) policy (CJCSI 3170.10G, March 2009). Figure 2, from CJCSI 3170.10G, 
shows the relationship established by this joint policy, between the JCIDS process and 
the DoD acquisition framework. Requirements documentation, born from a joint 
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), is refined as the material solution matures. The 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) drives the first acquisition decision, the Material 
Development Decision (MDD), where the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
authorizes entry into the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS). As the 
material solution matures, the requirements documents also mature as do the Capabilities 
Development Document (CDD), driving the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EDM) phase, and the Capabilities Production Document (CPD), driving 
the Production and Deployment phase. 
 
 
Figure 2.   JCIDS and Acquisition Framework Relationship (From: CJCSI 3170.10G, 
March 2009) 
The ISP, a key systems engineering document, is a requirement of the Net Ready 
Key Performance Parameter (NR-KPP) (CJCSI 6212.01E, December 2008). Per the 
CJCS 3170.01G JCIDS policy, the KPPs are validated at CDD approval. Therefore, key 
systems engineering documents can also introduce risk into the requirements maturation 
process, which must remain in synchronization with the acquisition management process. 
DODI 5000.02, December 2008 establishes a simplified and flexible management 
framework for translating capability needs and technology opportunities, based on 
approved capability needs, into stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition 
programs that include weapon systems, services, and Automated Information Systems 




(DAMS), Figure 3, from DODI 5000.02, December 2008 has decision points where both 
requirements and technical maturity are assessed as defined in the milestone entrance and 
entry criteria.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) (From DODI 5000.02, 
December 2008) 
Table 1 is an excerpt from Table 3 of DODI 5000.02, which lists the regulatory 
requirements for each milestone. Systems engineering documentation required for these 
milestones can be found in that table. This excerpt was chosen to highlight the ISP 
requirement. The ISP is also a statutory requirement of the Clinger Cohen Act (CCA), 
Table 2 (DODI 5000.02, December 2008). In addition to the ISP, the Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP) and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) are examples 
of other systems engineering documents required for milestone decisions. Each of those 
documents, in addition to the significant resources required for development, have a 
lengthy multi-organizational review and approval process that must be complete to 
support a milestone decision. Even with the technical complexity, the ISP is also 
subjected to complex and independent statutory, regulatory, and JCIDS review processes. 
Without proactive and frequent involvement with the reviewing and approving 
organizations, the document may be delayed. 
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 Table 1.   DAMS Regulatory Documentation (From: DODI 5000.02, December 2008) 
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 Table 2.   Clinger Cohen Act Statutory Requirements (From: DODI 5000.02, 
December 2008) 
The ISP is also required to support the Interoperability and Security (I&S) 
certification requirements of CJCSI 6212.01E. As an example of the complexities in the 
review process alone mandated in CJCSI 6212.01E Enclosure D (December 2008, p. D-
1), Joint Staffing and Certification Process, the following excerpt is provided:  
 11
CDD/CPD NR-KPP Technical Artifacts shall reside in the corresponding 
ISP and be readily available to all reviewers at the time of the CDD/CPD 
review (i.e., be included as an attachment or referenced as a hyperlink 
within the CDD/CPD). The use of the Enhanced Information Support Plan 
(EISP) tool is encouraged to facilitate the development of a standard ISP 
format and assist programs in risk mitigation. (CJCSI 6212.01E Enclosure 
D (December 2008, p. D-1) Joint Staffing and Certification Process) 
Note, this is the first time risk is mentioned in policy or instruction with this 
document, and there is no mention of risk in DODI 5000.02 (December 2008). 
C. ISP ROLE 
The ISP is not only a key systems engineering document capturing all but one of 
the required DODAF Enterprise Architecture Products (Table 3), but is also a statutory 
and regulatory requirement for DoD National Security Systems (NSS) and information 
technology (IT) systems as well as a required document for I&S certification (CJCSI 
6212.01E, December 2008).  
 
 
Table 3.   NR-KPP Products Matrix (From: CJCSI 6212.01E, December 2008) 
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The ISP is also a critical part of the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) 
Interoperability Test and Certification Process as shown in Figure 4. The ISP, as one of 
the five elements of the Net Ready KPP (NR-KPP), drives the testing planning, 
execution, and assessment. The assessment leads to the JITC I&S certification needed for 
progression through Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) and fielding. 
With an approved ISP required for the Interoperability and Supportability (I&S) 
certification, the technical resources (funded by the PM) must be provided or the ISP is at 
significant risk of being approved, subsequently placing the system under development at 




Figure 4.   JTIC Interoperability Test Process (From: CJCSI 6212.01E, December 
2008) 
D. RISK AREAS 
Figure 5 provides a visualization of the complexities for the ISP to support the 
DAMS, JCIDS, and I&S certification. There are three separate but related processes 
executing simultaneously. Each process has a multi-organizational oversight and review 
processes that, with a failure (either in review schedule, or technical issues) in one 
process, cascades into the next.  
 
 
Figure 5.   DAMS, JCIDS, I&S Certification Relationship (From: CJCSI 6212.01E, 
December 2008) 
The technical complexity of the ISP and the complexity of the review process 
introduce risk to progression through each of the three processes. Technical risk resides 
in the DODAF Integrated Architecture Products and schedule risk in the review and 





Systems engineering documentation is required, both by statutory law and 
regulatory policy, at the Joint, Agency, and Service acquisition levels. As such, these 
technical artifacts are as important as the technical maturation of the system itself. This 
chapter examined the specific case of the ISP because of the criticality of the document 
and the complexity of technical content and review process. Without these artifacts being 
technically sound and reviews/approvals complete, system progression through the DoD 
acquisition framework does not occur. Applying risk management practices specifically 
to these documents, as part of the initial project planning, is therefore warranted. The 
only instance where the ISP is mentioned as a tool for risk management is in CJCSI 
6212.01E. There is no mention in DODI 5000.2 that technical artifacts like the ISP 
should be connected to risk management. Given the information provided in this chapter, 
risk management practices should be targeted specifically at systems engineering 
documentation.  
With the premise set that there is indeed a need to manage the risks to systems 
engineering documents, Chapter III furthers research risk management, risk modeling, 
and risk assessment as key tenants of controlling uncertainty in the development, review, 
and approval of these technical artifacts. 
 16
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III. RESEARCH ON APPLICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
TO SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DOCUMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although risk management principles are required for all Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP), effective implementation of risk management is more 
difficult and less likely. Of 25 MDAP programs examined by GAO, only three had 
adequately performed the five criteria essential for assessing technical risk (E. H. 
Conrow, 2003). The management of project risks, typically around cost, schedule, and 
performance is a requirement for the DoD PM. Both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are applied as deemed appropriate by the PM. In fact, the PM is more likely 
to be risk averse than be proactive risk managers because of the additional oversight, 
attention, and reporting that the identification of risk brings to today’s DoD programs.  
This chapter researches risk management, risk modeling, and risk assessment, and 
explore applicability to systems engineering documentation as a tenant of controlling 
uncertainty in the development, review, and approval of these technical artifacts. Chapter 
IV then examines the human element of risk management. Since Program Management 
and the development of complex warfighting systems is a human endeavor, it is 
necessary to understand the effect of human behavior and perspective on risk 
management. 
B. RISK MANAGEMENT, MODELING, AND ASSESSMENT 
The complexity of modern weapon systems and IT systems introduces inherent 
uncertainties in the cost, schedule, and performance of the program, which will 
eventually deliver them to the warfighter. These uncertainties make it essential that 
proactive risk management occur.  
There are common themes, or tenants, of an effective risk management program. 
First and foremost, is that although risk management is an integral part of the project, it 
must be addressed specifically (Y. Y. Haimes, 2004). Therefore, risk management plans, 
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risk management boards, and risk specific processes for identification, modeling, 
classification, mitigation, control, and assessment are part of an effective risk strategy. 
Risk management is also a continuous effort that lasts throughout the project since risks 
can be introduced at all phases. Factors such as shortages in commercial commodities, 
introduction of new commercial technologies, funding cuts, and requirements changes 
can occur at anytime. The implementation of a sound risk management approach can 
address these uncertainties. 
Risk management is essential because key cost, schedule, and performance 
attributes are uncertain or unknown until late in the program. However, risks can be 
identified early in the program and alleviated with good risk management practices. 
Further, risk management should be considered as part of the day-to-day job function at 
the working level (Conrow, 2003). 
With risk management touching all phases, aspects, and organizations associated 
with a project, clear roles and responsibilities for risk management are required. E. H. 
Conrow (2003) recommends that a Risk Manager be assigned and that a Risk 
Management Board (RMB) is formed, chaired by the PM. The RMB is the hub of the risk 
management effort, is inclusive of engineers and project managers, and performs the 
following (Conrow, 2003, p. 116). 
 Prioritizes risks 
 Defines risk management roles and responsibilities 
 Works all risk issues. 
 Makes or concurs with all risk management related decisions  
With engineers and project managers participating in the RMB, and with all risk 
issues worked and documented in that forum, it is important that representatives of the 
different elements of the project are able to communicate the risks in their areas of 
responsibility. Although the human element of risk management is addressed in Chapter 
IV, the point here is that critical decisions affecting project success are made in a board 
setting requiring effective communications. 
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Maintaining perspective on the problem at hand is an important part of program 
management. Therefore, it is important to define both risk and risk management in the 
context of the project since it is ultimately the project that needs to be successful for the 
war-fighting capability to be fielded. Smith and Merritt (2002, p. 5) define risk “as the 
possibility that an undesired outcome-or the absence of a desired outcome-disrupts your 
project” and risk management as “the activity of identifying and controlling undesired 
project outcomes proactively.” There are many definitions of risk and risk management. 
Smith and Merritt’s (2002) definition of risk was not chosen for convenience, but for the 
direct relationship between risk and the project. For DoD acquisition, it is the entire 
project that must succeed; the system must work (effective and suitable), statutory and 
regulatory requirements met, mandated process and policies followed, milestone 
decisions approved, certifications and approvals obtained. Therefore, risk must be 
managed in the context of the project, not just the cost, schedule, and performance of the 
weapon, or IT system, specifically. 
Forsberg, Moos, and Cotterman (2005), provide visualization for whether risks 
must be managed from a project perspective (Figure 6). System performance is not 
enough for the program to be successful. External and internal implementation risks can 
lead to the project’s cancellation, regardless of system performance and maturity 
(Forsberg, Moos, and Cotterman, 2005). With the political environment in which DoD 
systems are acquired, programs are particularly vulnerable to implementation risks 
(funding, political support, resources). Of particular note is the identification of planning 
as an internal risk. Statutory and regulatory systems engineering documentation must be 
accounted for in proper project planning. With the technical and review/approval 
complexities of these documents, the uncertainties must be addressed with risk 
management. In fact, the CMMI includes risk management in the Project Management 
Process Area (CMMI, May 2007). 
 Figure 6.   Project Risk Categories (From: Forsberg, Moos, and Cotterman, 2005) 
Accurate assessment of risks is an essential step in implementing effective risk 
mitigation strategies as part of the overarching risk management strategy. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods can be applied. Qualitative analysis uses judgment 
and expert opinion to evaluate the probability and consequence values, where quantitative 
analysis uses probabilistic and statistical methods (Ayyub, 2003).  
The choice to use either qualitative or quantitative methods is largely determined 
by the quality and availability of data. Without detailed data, qualitative analysis can still 
be performed and be founded on subject matter experts’ opinions and judgments. 
Although perhaps not optimal, risk mitigation plans can still be generated and the RMB 
can still manage all the risks. Additionally, the identified risk may not be serious enough 
to warrant expenditure of project resources to model and quantitatively assess the risk. It 
simply may not be needed.  
Quantitative risk analysis distills risk down into a numeric probability or 
likelihood of failure. For the purposes of this research, the inverse is applied to quantify 
the probability of success of having critical systems engineering documentation approved 
as required for milestone decisions and fielding of capability. Equally as important, 
“quantitative analysis generally provides a more uniform understanding among different 
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individuals, but requires quality data for accurate results” (Ayyub, 2003, p. 84). Too 
often, the different perspectives and competition for resources lead to an inability to find 
common ground resulting in inaccurate assessments of risk. With project risks quantified, 
the diverse project team’s energy and resources can be directed toward a common 
understanding of those things that could cause project failure. 
To generate the quantitative probability distribution functions, the system and/or 
processes must be modeled before analysis can begin. Event Modeling (Event Trees, 
Success Trees, and Fault Trees) are systemic and often the most complete way to identify 
accident scenarios and quantify risk (Ayyub, 2003). Event trees identify failures from an 
initiating event and are further refined by modeling only the significant successes and 
failures through Success Tree and Fault Tree analysis. The outcome of the Success and 
Fault Tree analysis is the probability of occurrence of the top-level event, whether it is a 
top-level success or failure.  
Network modeling, particularly from a project management perspective, can be an 
effective method for quantitative risk analysis. DoD acquisition programs are typically, 
large projects with many interrelated activities, and must be executed in a specific time 
sequence (milestone decisions). By representing the project, and sub-projects as a 
network(s), the probability of network success can be quantified. A network is a set of 
nodes connected in various ways by directional arcs (Ragsdale, 2007). Since DoD 
programs operate within a specific framework (DODI 5000.02, December 2008), and 
particularly with industry demonstrating process discipline (CMMI, 2007), task times and 
nodes can be accurately defined. The opportunity to apply network modeling effectively 
to project management is certainly there and explored in Chapter V. 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
DOCUMENTATION 
The complexity of the review and approval process alone for statutory and 
regulatory required systems engineering documents, introduces uncertainties that must be 
managed as risk. To make the point, Figure 7 shows the JROC review process for 
documentation and provides a good visualization of the complexity of only one part of 
the review process. Each of these organizational reviews introduces uncertainties, 
particularly in that they are resource constrained introducing a queuing problem as well.  
 
 
Figure 7.   JROC Staffing Process (From: CJCSI 6212.01E, December 2008) 
The JROC staffing process is preceded by a thorough local organizational review 
and Service level review that is no less complex, and therefore, introducing uncertainties 





In addition to the review and approval processes, systems engineering documents 
must be built in a specific sequence or extensive rework and inefficient application of 
resources results affecting both cost and schedule. For example, 90% of the required 
information in a Systems View-6 (SV-6) of the CDD and ISP is a paste from the 
Operational View-3 (OV-3). Operational Views (OV) are architecture views describing 
the joint capabilities as well as identifying the operational nodes and critical information 
needed (CJCSI 6212.01E, December 2008). The OV-3 is therefore built by the 
requirements organization, not the acquisition organizations. The building of each of 
these views is dependent on information from other views as well as information from 
other interoperating organizations. Until the OV-3 is complete, for example, the SV-6 
cannot be completed. Uncertainty is introduced simply from the dependencies and given 
the complexity of interoperability between systems. Uncertainty is also introduced from 
the technical challenges of data and information exchange between war-fighting systems. 
The criticality of these systems engineering documents to the project along with the 
uncertainties introduced through the complex technical challenges of interoperability and 
the multiple review processes clearly warrant a specific risk management effort. 
D. SUMMARY 
Having explored the need, and in fact the requirement, for DoD programs to 
manage project uncertainty through the implementation of sound and proactive risk 
management strategies, research has yet to find systems engineering documentation 
specifically addressed as a risk or the need to manage it. These documents are statutory 
and/or regulatory requirements for DoD weapon, and IT systems to progress through the 
acquisition process, including operations and sustainment. Furthermore, these documents 
are technical artifacts capturing significant technical effort that drive system design and 
through the review and approval process, demonstrate technical maturity required for 





With the addition of the complex multi-organizational review and approval 
process, the uncertainties must be specifically addressed through risk management, 
driven by quantitative risk analysis. The sequential nature of the development and review 
of these technical artifacts lends itself to the application of network modeling to quantify 
the probability of failure, and inversely, the probability of success, that these documents 
are ready on time to support the DoD acquisition process. 
The acceptance that controlling the uncertainty of the project must include risk 
management of systems engineering documentation is a key acknowledgement by a PM. 
However, even when acceptance is combined with motivation and commitment to 
manage risk, effective risk management requires and understanding of the human 
decision making process. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the human element of risk 
management in the next chapter. 
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IV. RESEARCH ON THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of Risk Management Boards, the inclusion of all project team 
members in risk management, qualitative and quantitative assessment of project risks, 
and the complex review and approval processes for systems engineering documents bring 
human and environmental influences inherent in the diverse nature of the work and the 
contributing organizations. Each organization has a perspective and culture that affects 
results, each has responsibility and/or accountability for the quality and timeliness of 
critical project needs, and each has external influences not controlled by the project.  
This chapter explores the human element in risk management. Project data is 
analyzed, severity and impact assessed, and mitigation plans established. However, 
organizations and individuals can look at the same data and arrive at different 
conclusions. This not only occurs inside project teams, but in every day lives. For 
example, a jury  sees the same data, but arrives at different conclusions. The same goes 
for voting, political party loyalty and even brand loyalty. With the human influence on 
results and conclusions, application of the research into the human element of risk 
management is essential for developing an accurate risk model and quantitative 
assessment method defined in Chapter V.  
B. BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCES ON RISK MANAGEMENT 
Both individual and organizational behaviors impact the ability to implement an 
effective risk management program. “Social learning theory, as proposed by Albert 
Bandura, encompasses a theory of observational learning that holds most people learn 
behaviors by observing others and then modeling the behaviors perceived as being 
effective” (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 1992, p. 109). For example, if a project engineer 
disagrees with a technical solution proposed by management and is summarily chastised 
or punished, it is then more than likely that bad news is not brought forward again. 
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Furthermore, if management’s reaction is seen as effective or appropriate by others, then 
any other technical disagreements may not be brought forward. Risk management, to be 
effective, has to be implemented at the lowest levels of the project team. With that, 
organizational leaders must encourage the responsible identification and proactive 
management of risk by all.  
Risk management must be performed commensurate with holistic systems 
engineering and systems thinking. Risks cannot be identified and managed in a sporadic 
or ad-hoc fashion or critical program risks may never be mitigated. “Good management 
of technological systems must address the holistic nature of the system in terms of its 
hierarchical, organizational, and fundamental decision making structure” (Haimes, 2004, 
p. 18). In this statement, Haimes points directly at the human element aspect of effective 
risk management. Implementation must be dovetailed into the project team’s normal 
operations so that risk management occurs at the lowest levels, and is allowed to execute 
like other team work and reporting. However, large projects have many teams, cultures, 
and operations processes that contribute to inefficiencies and errors in communications 
and integration of team functions. The quantification of risks from an end-to-end product 
development viewpoint provides common ground for the right organizational dynamics 
and decision making to unfold. The comprehensive network model and resulting 
cumulative probability function upcoming in Chapter V provides the approach for 
bridging organizational and perspective divides by offering a single cumulative 
distribution function for the technical, review, and approval functions. 
Haimes (2004) takes the idea that the holistic or systems thinking needed for 
project success can be realized by building on Covey’s principles of personal leadership 
in the book “The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People” (Covey, 1989). “Indeed, 
Covey’s journey for personal development as detailed in his book has much in common 
with the holistic systems concept that constitutes the foundation of the field of systems 




Habit 1 Be proactive 
Habit 2 Begin with the end in mind 
Habit 3 Put first things first 
Habit 4 Think win-win 
Habit 5 Seek first to understand, then to be understood 
Habit 6 Synergize 
Habit 7 Sharpen the saw 
With the focus of this research on the introduction of a comprehensive 
quantitative risk model in the project planning phase, Habit 1 and Habit 2 will be 
explored because they are key personal behaviors that affect the project team’s ability to 
plan the project, including planning for uncertainties.  
Being proactive (Habit 1) addresses how to view the problem. Covey approaches 
the problem with a concept of concentric circles. The Circle of Concern includes all 
things that are important while the Circle of Influence includes those things that are not 
under the project team’s control (Haimes, 2004). It is imperative that the project team 
embrace this; particularly, since the review/approval and certification activities of key 
systems engineering documents occurs outside of the project team’s circle of influence. It 
is not enough to manage the uncertainty of the internal technical work, since the project is 
still at risk of failure due to the uncertainties in the extensive complex review and 
approval processes discussed earlier. The accomplishment of technical work cannot be 
severed from the review, approval, and certification process. The project network 
proposed for the ISP in Chapter V encompasses both of Covey’s circles by accounting for 
the end-to-end, or comprehensive, effort required to obtain ISP approval. 
There are two key tenants of Habit 2; begin with the end in mind. The first is to 
begin with the image of the end. Covery (1989) states, “To begin with the end in mind 
means to start with a clear understanding of your destination. It means to know where 
you’re going so that you better understand where you are now and so that the steps you 
take are always in the right direction” (p. 98). Figure 8 (Haimes and Schneiter, 1996)  
 
 
provides a visualization of the holistic view of the things that can be influenced, those 




Figure 8.   Systems View of Concentric Circles (From: Haimes and Schneiter, 1996) 
To relate this to project management, the performance of project planning per the 
CMMI Project Planning Process Area (Figure 9) is the means by which the project team 
“begins with the end in mind.” The Specific Goal (SG) 1 forms the image of the end by 
defining the scope and life cycle of the project while (what is it, and how long does it 
live) while Specific Practice (SP) 2.1 identifies the uncertainties in the steps to be taken 
toward the end state (CMMI, May 2007). 
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 Figure 9.   Project Planning Process (From: (CMMI, May 2007).) 
The second tenant is: 
All things are created twice. Take the construction of a home, for example. 
You create it in every detail before you ever hammer the first nail into 
place…….you work with ideas. You work with your mind until you get a 
clear image of what you want to build. Then you reduce it to blueprint and 
develop construction plans…….Then in the second creation, the physical 
creation, you will have to make expensive changes that may double the 
cost of your home……you begin with the end in mind. (Covey, 1998, p. 
99) 
Covey indicates that things must be built twice; the latter being the physical 
object that can be executed in project planning activities, followed by development of the 
physical system. For DoD programs, more than the physical system must be built both 
times. With the mandate to meet statutory and regulatory requirements during 
acquisition, those key systems engineering documents must also be built twice. As 
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previously addressed, the program cannot be successful if both the technical quality and 
time elements (milestone reviews) of these documents are not planned for, i.e., the first 
build, and then delivered, i.e., the physical build.  
It is essential for the project success that at the beginning (project planning), the 
PM has a clear image that the end of a successful program include the following. 
 Delivery of an effective, suitable, and affordable system 
 Delivery of a system on time 
 Delivery of systems engineering documentation that is in compliance with 
all statutory and regulatory requirements 
Experience has shown that the PM is typically shortsighted with item 3. In other 
words, the maturity of the systems engineering documentation becomes an increasing 
concern as the milestone approaches. It is almost certainly not planned for at the 
beginning, with the same detail and energy as the system development work is planned 
for, to include risk. The comprehensive quantitative risk model proposed in Chapter V 
begins the systems engineering documentation work with the end in mind. For the ISP, 
the end must be an approved document, which is not always in the circle of influence. 
Failure to have this document approved, within the time sequence the program needs, 
results in program failure. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON RISK MANAGEMENT 
In addition to the influence of human behaviors on the success or failure of a 
project, the environments in which the SE and PM operate in affect perspective, 
behaviors, and actions. Haimes (2004, p. 7) states: 
Covey stresses the understanding of paradigms–the lenses through which 
we see the universe. Furthermore….it is not what happens to us that 
affects our behavior; rather, it is our interpretation of what happens. Since 
our interpretation of the world we live in determines how we create new 
and innovative solutions to the problems we face…understanding the 
systemic nature of the universe and defining the system that we need to 
address are imperative requirements for our ability to solve problems. 
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The PM and SE see the world through different lenses. The PM is responsible and 
accountable for the overall success or failure of the program. Managing cost, schedule, 
performance, constraints, stakeholder relationships, oversight relationships, contracts, 
CAIV, T&E, reporting requirements, and endless briefings consume the PM’s time and 
attention. It is a politically charged environment where competition for resources, hidden 
and secondary agendas, and inquiries from powerful DoD and congressional leaders must 
be navigated through so that the project team can execute. 
Systems Engineers see the world as more structured. Rational and logical thought 
processes are dominate for problem solving and decision making; start with the 
requirements, develop functional, allocated, and physical baselines, architect and design, 
build and test, etc. The technical problems are no less complex than the PM. Just 
different: requiring a different mindset and approach for success. 
The different lenses through which these two entities of the project team see the 
world cause communication issues, which start at the very beginning of the project, 
during planning when resources are estimated. How do the engineers compete for limited 
resources, particularly for something that is not a functioning part of the system such as 
systems engineering documentation that may not be required for years? This is unlikely 
to receive serious attention from the PM given all of the things to be dealt with in the 
PM’s politically charged world unless the engineers can communicate their needs in a 
way that gains clarity through the PM’s lens. 
To understand the organizational cognitive lenses or paradigms better, (Bolman 
and Deal, 1997) explore the concept of framing by stating, “A frame is a coherent set of 
ideas that enable you to see and understand more clearly what goes on day to day” (p. 
41). A frame is a set of ideas or assumptions that help you understand and negotiate a 




The Bolman and Deal (1997) Four-Frame Model (Table 4) proposes four lenses in 
which leaders can view the world. For this research, the focus will be on the Political 
Frame, the frame from which the PM operates, and the Structural Frame, the frame from 
which the SE operates. 
 
 
Table 4.   Four Frame Model (From: Bohlman and Deal, 1997) 
To make sense of the political environment in which the PM operates, the 
Political Frame is the cognitive model applied. Five propositions summarize this 
perspective (Simon, 2007). 
 Organizations are coalitions of various individuals and interest groups 
 There are enduring differences among coalition members in values, 
beliefs, information, interest, and perceptions of reality 
 Most important decisions involve the allocation of scarce resources-who 
gets what 
 Scarce resources and enduring differences give conflict a central role in 
organizational dynamics and make power the most important resource 
 Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying 
for position among different stakeholders 
 32
 33
Particularly in the project planning phase, the bargaining, negotiation, and 
jockeying in proposition 5 are at a peak. The PM’s decision to resource systems 
engineering documentation is weighed against all of the other competing efforts, and 
more often than not, is determined not to be critical, or even competitive. The 
comprehensive risk model proposed in Chapter V presents the requirement for resourcing 
in the PM’s cognitive frame, in terms of risk. The work can then be resourced to the 
desired risk level, with the PM accepting the residual risk.  
From personal experience, the inability of the Navy Working Capital Fund 
organizations, i.e., the Warfare Centers, to communicate with the PM in their frame, 
results in critical technical work not being resourced. The Structural Frame is the 
cognitive frame, from which the SE operates. Six assumptions undergird the Structural 
Frame (Simon, 2007): 
 Organizations exist to achieve established goals and objectives 
 Organizations work best when rationality prevails over personal 
preferences and external pressures 
 Structures must be designed to fit an organization’s circumstances 
(including its goals, technology, and environment) 
 Organizations increase efficiency and enhance performance through 
specialization and division of labor 
 Appropriate forms of coordination and control are essential to ensuring 
that individuals and units work together in the service of organizational 
goals 
 Problems and performance gaps arise from structural deficiencies and can 
be remediated through restructuring 
The Structural Frame is markedly different from the Political Frame. Rational 
thought prevails, not competition and negotiation. In the context of critical systems 
engineering documentation, two prevailing problems must be overcome. First, the 
systems engineering leadership would provide a cost and schedule estimate for the 
technical work based on input from Subject Matter Experts (SME). This estimate would 
compete for resources with other program efforts. The systems engineers would not view 
this as work that should be competed for, but simply, as work that must be done.  
The likelihood that the estimate would compete well is small, and in fact, 
experience has shown this to be true. Table 5 provides the status of required ISPs for the 
Marine Air/Ground Task Force Command and Control, Weapons, and Sensors 
Development and Integration (MC2I) Product Group (PG) at Marine Corps Systems 
Command (MCSC) and shows that 92.3% (12 of 13) active efforts are late. 
 
 
Table 5.   MCSC MC2I PG ISP Status December 18, 2008 
A questionnaire (Table 6) was provided to the Architecture Center of Excellence 




1. For each node in the ISP development 
network previously provided, what are the 
costs for each node, both labor and resources, 
in units relative to node times ($/day)? 
SPAWAR does not have the data to provide 
sufficient details there. They recommend strongly 
that no costs be assigned to the nodes shown in the 
ISP development network diagram. It is well 
documented that ISPs, beginning to final 
acceptance, can vary in costs anywhere from $150K 
to $3M depending on project scope and solution 




directly impacted by project complexity and size, 
making it impossible to assign values to the nodes 
without applying the process to a specific program.  
2. What is the cause of the variance at each 
node? 
a. Rework 
b. Difficulty of task 
c. Availability of resources 
d. Knowledge of subject/task not adequate 
e. Technical work uncovers errors or 
inconsistencies in previous tasks/nodes 
that must be adjudicated 
f. Inadequate tools 
g. Incomplete planning for tasks for that 
node 
h. Other (please specify/describe) 
a. Rework does not apply to development node 
variance within this process. Nodes 19, 21 and 23 
capture rework times. 
b. Difficulty of task is the major cause of variance 
of all nodes. 
c. Availability of resources should be scoped at 
start, and therefore, minimized at each node.  
d. Inadequate knowledge of subject/task is the 
second major variance of all nodes. 
e. Not a major consideration on node variance due 
to the nature of node start times being directly 
dependant on the completion of previous nodes. 
f. Required tools should be scoped at start, and 
therefore, minimized variance at each node. 
g. If the process is followed, planning is largely 
taken care of by process flow. No major cause of 
variance. 
h. Other (please specify/describe) 
3. Are labor and resource requirements 
identified to the PM prior to commencing 
ISP development per the network diagram 
provided? 
History has shown that the PM do not typically plan 
for ISP/Architecture development early enough in 
the acquisition process, largely due to a lack of 
understanding of what the documents are and what 
their intended uses are. 
4. In your opinion, does the PM understand the 
effort (time, resources, and process) required 
to develop and gain ISP approval prior to 
commencement of ISP development? 
No. Training must be provided to each PM to lay 
out in simple terms the ISP development process 
and what resources are required to complete it. 
These resources do not only include architects and 
tools, but critical program documentation and SMEs 
who must be integrated into the process from the 
beginning. Furthermore, it is unrealistic for PMs to 
be expected to stay current on ISP/Architecture 
standards, development and policy changes.  
Continuous expertise must be maintained in this 
area and relayed accordingly back to the PMs. 
    NOTE: All PMs are trained that an initial ISP is 
developed to support the ICD, then further 
developed for the CDD, and further elaborated for 
the CPD or during production. The reality is that the 
absence of JCIDS documents means ISPs are 
developed during or post milestone C, which means 
the prep-work normally done is all rolled up into a 
single document and bolted onto a product. 
5. Provide any other thoughts or information 
that need to be quantified to plan this work 
better. 
PMs must be educated that ISPs/Architectures are 
the front end of engineering, not bolt-on products 
after the fact. Recommend adopting strategic goals 
and objectives to include measures associated with 
IA, ISPs and IATOs at the PM and MSIT level. This 
is a culture change that must take place to achieve 
 36
Question Response 
quality systems acquisition with shrinking budgets. 
ISPs/Architectures can be expensive to create, but 
their use and reuse  provides significant ROI across 
the PG. 
6. Identify the node or nodes and the reason for 
the red status (should be from 2. above) 
provided in the 12/18/08 ISP status table. 
Without clarification from the creator of the 
12/18/08 ISP status table as to how the color 
designations were assigned, no correlation between 
the status table and the ISP development process 
can accurately be made. Basically, the sheet was 
created for Mike Ferraro by Tim King without any 
documented logic but as a way to track the ISP 
administratively in MCSC staffing process. 
Table 6.   SSC-L Architecture COE Questionnaire (From: SSC-L Architecture COE, 
June 2009) 
The response to question 2b regarding variance, indicates a strong presence of 
uncertainty in the technical work itself. Responses to questions 4 and 5 point directly to 
the framing problem previously discussed, particularly during project planning.  
The second problem to overcome is that the technical work and assembly of the 
document is estimated and then performed by the systems engineering organization. 
Their estimate and goal (success) is to complete that document. The subsequent review 
and certification process is in the hands of the PM’s organization and is performed very 
much in a political environment where negotiation and advocacy are the norm. 
Essentially, this document is subject to a difficult frame transition without an end-to-end 
estimate of resources. The comprehensive risk model proposed in Chapter V accounts for 
all three of these challenges. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the influences of individual and organizational behaviors, 
and the environment in which these organizations operate, on the ability of the project 
team to solve problems and be successful. An effective risk management plan must be 




execution. For that to occur, a thorough understanding on how the diverse organizations 
that comprise a project team see the world is required. Only when individual workers are 
effective and resourced can the project be successful. 
A common understanding between the systems engineering and project 
management organizations on program success can be found by beginning with the end 
in mind (Covey, 1998). Through proactive leadership, the team can get their arms around 
both the things they can control and better understand those they cannot to define the 
steps needed for success. Those uncertainties inherent in things outside of the project 
team’s influence can be addressed through effective risk management. 
Framing theory (Bohlman & Deal, 1997) provides insight into how the different 
environments the PM and SE operate in affect the decision making process. The political 
world of the PM, dominated by constrained resources, negotiation, and agendas is far 
different from the rational in which world engineers operate. Bridging this gap is critical 
to the success of the project, particularly in the planning phase when scarce resources are 
negotiated for and allocated. 
Lastly, the data collected from the SSC-L Architecture COE (June 2009) points 
directly to these behavioral and environmental influences as a major cause for the 92.3% 
late status. The PM simply does not resource this work up front, but apply pressure and 
resources too late. The technical difficulty of the task is the main contributor to the 
variance. This uncertainty can be addressed through the implementation of effective risk 
management practices. However, with the responsibility for the successful approval of 
the ISP dependent on the effectiveness of both the PM and engineering organizations, the 
risk approach for the ISP must be an end-to-end approach to address uncertainties in both 
environments.  
Chapter V proposes a comprehensive risk model that considers the end-to-end 
challenges, explored in the first four chapters, of developing and approving complex 
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V. ISP QUANTITATIVE RISK MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Systems engineering documents, as required by statute and regulation for DoD 
weapon, and IT systems acquisition, are as important to program success as the 
effectiveness, suitability, and affordability of the system itself. The ISP, being one of the 
most complex systems engineering documents, has been the focus of this research. 
Chapters I through IV explored the JCIDS and DoD acquisition framework requirements 
for the ISP, the need to address the risks early in the planning phase, the human and 
environmental influences on risk management, and examined data from the Architecture 
COE.  
This chapter proposes a risk model for the development of the ISP that begins 
with the end in mind, approval of the ISP. By representing the end-to-end process as a 
comprehensive single network, two previously explored critical points of failure are 
addressed. First, the efforts for both the systems engineering and PM organizations are 
represented in the network so that the entire effort can be planned, proactively and with 
the end in mind. The activities, expressed as nodes in the network, were provided by the 
Architecture COE. Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) was used for 
scheduling of the network. Critical Path analysis was then performed and a cumulative 
probability distribution function calculated. 
Second, by providing a quantitative risk assessment for the comprehensive 
network, the frame transition issues between the SE and PM are overcome through 
common risk based communications. In other words, the PM accepts the risks associated 
with the level of resources the PM provides, per a cumulative probability distribution 
function. 
B. ISP NETWORK DIAGRAM 
The ISP, as previously discussed, is a systems engineering document that is the 
technical artifact capturing the results of extensive and complex technical work. Without 
this technical effort, battlefield interoperability is unlikely to be realized and I&S 
certification not achieved. Figure 10 provides the scheduling of all the technical work, 
document assembly, and multi-organizational reviews for completion and approval of the 
ISP. Note that there is a sequence for development of the DODAF views that must be 
followed, which creates dependencies captured in the network diagram.  
 
 
Figure 10.   ISP Development Network (From: SSC-L Architecture COE, June 2009)  
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In addition to the sequential nature of the work, the DODAF views are generated 
by multiple organizations with the Operational Views (OV) being the responsibility of 
the requirements organizations, and the System Views (SV) the responsibility of the 
engineering arm of the acquisition organization. There is also an iterative aspect to the 
DODAF view development. Node 11 finalizes the All View (AV)-1 developed as a draft 
in Node 2. Also, Node 13 is where the architecture analysis occurs and resultant changes 
implemented into the DODAF views as needed. The start, stop, and duration times for 
each node were generating using the PERT approach explored in the next section. 
The three main efforts required for ISP approval are all represented in the 
comprehensive network. These efforts include the following: 
1. The generation of the DODAF views, Nodes 1 through 11 and 13 
2. The assembly of the ISP document, Nodes 12 through 17 
3. The multi-organizational review and approval, Nodes 18 through 23 
The frame transition issues discussed in Chapter IV can be seen in the network 
and occur at Node 1 where the PM has not resourced the work up front (Architecture 
COE, June 2009), and at Node 18 when the PM’s organization has to push the document 
through the local, Service, and Joint review process, each with a unique perspective.  
With the comprehensive project network in place, the next steps are to estimate 
the efforts, determine the critical path, and perform quantitative risk assessment. 
C. PERT ANALYSIS 
With the previously discussed complexities of ISP development and approval, 
captured in the single comprehensive project network, the PERT approach was applied 
for project scheduling. Nahmias (2005) recommends PERT when uncertainty in activity 
times is present because PERT estimates provide the effects of uncertainty on the project 
completion time. In addition to the uncertainty perspective, PERT was chosen because of 
the non-threatening approach to estimating. Had Critical Path Method (CPM) been used, 
the minimum completion times for each node would have to be estimated by the SE and 
PM. Given both that this is the initial attempt to capture the end-to-end process in a single 
project network, and the lack of historical data (SSC-L Architecture COE, June 2009), 
the SE and PM were not comfortable with providing a deterministic estimate. This is 
important since an effective risk management plan is implemented at the worker level. To 
gain worker buy-in and trust for this new process, allowing uncertainties in their ability to 
estimate is key to effective implementation.  
The PERT approach has the SMEs provide three estimates; best or optimistic (a), 
worst or pessimistic (b), and most likely (m). These estimates are then used to construct a 
beta distribution for each node of the network. By assuming the activity times are 
independent random variables, a mean, standard deviation, and variance can be calculated 
for each node using the following formulas (Nahmis, 2005, p. 508). 
 Mean     a 4m b / 6   
 Standard Deviation    b a / 6    
 Variance    22 b a / 36    
The central limit theorem is then used to justify a normal distribution. 
The central limit theorem says that the distribution of the sum of 
independent random variables is approximately normal as the number of 
terms is the sum grows large. Convergence occurs rather quickly. 
(Nahmis, 2005, p. 509) 
The PERT approach then assumes that the critical path is the path with the longest 
expected completion times ( ). The next section explores the critical path analysis and 
results. The total project time is a sum of critical activities and is assumed to be normally 
distributed, as previously discussed. 
The PERT estimates given in Table 7 were provided by the Architecture COE 
with the mean/expected times ( ) and variance ( 2 ) calculated as per the equations 
provided above.  
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Node Activity Optimistic (a) Most Likely (m) Pessimistic (b) Expected () std dev () variance ()
1 Develop OV‐1 2 5 10 5.33 1.33 1.78
2 Draft AV‐1 5 10 15 10.00 1.67 2.78
3 Develop OV‐5 30 45 90 50.00 10.00 100.00
4 Develop OV‐2 5 10 15 10.00 1.67 2.78
5 Develop OV‐6C 30 45 90 50.00 10.00 100.00
6 OV‐4 5 10 15 10.00 1.67 2.78
7 SV‐5 15 25 60 29.17 7.50 56.25
8 SV‐4 10 20 60 25.00 8.33 69.44
9 SV‐6 5 15 30 15.83 4.17 17.36
10 TV‐1 5 10 15 10.00 1.67 2.78
11 AV‐1 15 25 45 26.67 5.00 25.00
12 Develop ISP Sec I 15 20 30 20.83 2.50 6.25
13 Analyze Arch 20 30 45 30.83 4.17 17.36
14 IA RFI 30 45 60 45.00 5.00 25.00
15 Develop ISP Sec II 15 30 45 30.00 5.00 25.00
16 Develop ISP Sec III 5 10 20 10.83 2.50 6.25
17 Complete ISP Draft 10 15 25 15.83 2.50 6.25
18 MCSC ISP Review 15 30 60 32.50 7.50 56.25
19 CRM Updates 1 10 15 30 16.67 3.33 11.11
20 Asn RDA Review 15 30 60 32.50 7.50 56.25
21 CRM Updates 2 5 10 15 10.00 1.67 2.78
22 JCPAT Review 30 60 90 60.00 10.00 100.00
23 CRM Updates 3 5 10 15 10.00 1.67 2.78
Total Days 302 525 940 557
 
Table 7.   PERT Estimates for ISP Network (From: SSC-L Architecture COE, June 
2009) 
A quick analysis of the node results shows significant variance of more than 50 days for 
30%, or seven of the 23 nodes. The effects of this can be seen back in the total optimistic 
and pessimistic difference of 638 days. To put this difference into perspective, a PM plan 
based on optimistic ISP development time, could be under estimated by almost a year and 
nine months. Recalling that the ISP is a required document for milestones and fielding, 
significant schedule risk is obvious and requires a proactive and effective risk 
management effort. With the activity times estimated, the PERT process continues in the 
next section with an exploration of the critical path for the ISP network. Once the critical 
path is determined, project schedule and probability of success can be calculated.  
D. CRITICAL PATH ANALYSIS 
The critical path for a project network is defined as the longest path (in time) 
through the network since this is the minimum time in which the project can be 
completed. Nahmias’ (2005) process for determining the critical path was applied to the 
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ISP network. A forward pass through the network using the mean duration, or expected 
times, for each activity was performed to find the early start and finish times. A backward 






















Activity Mean Duration() Early Start (ES) Early Finish (EF) Late Start (LS) Late Finish (LF) LS‐ES LF‐EF
1 0.00 5.33 0.00 5.33 0.00 0.00
2 5.33 15.33 5.33 15.33 0.00 0.00
3 15.33 65.33 15.33 65.33 0.00 0.00
4 10.00 65.33 75.33 81.16 91.16 15.83 15.83 0
5 50.00 75.33 125.33 91.16 141.16 15.83 15.83 0
6 10.00 75.33 85.33 131.16 141.16 55.83 55.83 0
7 65.33 94.50 65.33 94.50 0.00 0.00
8 94.50 119.50 94.50 119.50 0.00 0.00
9 119.50 135.33 119.50 135.33 0.00 0.00
10 135.33 145.33 135.33 145.33 0.00 0.00
11 145.33 172.00 145.33 172.00 0.00 0.00
12 20.83 172.00 192.83 218.66 239.49 46.66 46.66 0
13 172.00 202.83 172.00 202.83 0.00 0.00
14 45.00 172.00 217.00 194.49 239.49 22.49 22.49 0
15 202.83 232.83 202.83 232.83 0.00 0.00
16 232.83 243.66 232.83 243.66 0.00 0.00
17 243.66 259.49 243.66 259.49 0.00 0.00
18 259.49 291.99 259.49 291.99 0.00 0.00
19 291.99 308.66 291.99 308.66 0.00 0.00
20 308.66 341.16 308.66 341.16 0.00 0.00
21 341.16 351.16 341.16 351.16 0.00 0.00
22 351.16 411.16 351.16 411.16 0.00 0.00




Table 8.   ISP Network Critical Path Analysis Results 
By identifying the activities that have no slack time, the critical path can be found since 
any delay in those tasks delays the start of the next task, thus causing a delay in the 
project completion. The critical path is indicated in red in Table 7. An Excel spreadsheet 
model was created to identify the critical path (last column) by returning a “1” and the 
slack times were “0.” 
The critical path for the ISP network is activities; 1-2-3-7-8-9-10-11-13-15-16-17-
18-19-20-21-22-23, or 18 of the 23 nodes (78.3%). Any slip in one of those nodes causes 
a delay in the ISP approval. With only one node (Node 5) with a variance greater than 50 
days that is not on the critical path, this is another indicator that the ISP development and 
approval is a very risky project. 
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The total project time of 421.17 days is found by summing the mean duration ( ) 
times for the critical path. The project standard deviation ( ) of 85.50 days is found by 
summing the standard deviations of the nodes on the critical path.  
The 421 days the project is mostly to take to complete is 119 days more than the 
optimistic estimate of 302 days. By using the PERT approach, which accounts for the 
uncertainty in each of the nodes, a more accurate estimate based on the most likely times 
has been found. With more than 78% of the nodes on the critical path, and with six of the 
seven nodes having a variance of greater than 50 days also on the critical path, the ISP 
development and approval project has a significant amount of risk exposure that must be 
managed. The estimate for both the project duration and project standard deviation can 
now be used for quantitative risk assessment.  
E. ISP CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION 
The project duration and standard deviation calculated using the PERT approach 
in the previous section can now be used to perform a quantitative risk assessment of the 
comprehensive ISP network. As discussed previously, the central limit theorem justifies 
the use of a normal distribution. Table 9 contains the results of the NORMINV Excel 
function for probabilities between 0 and 1. The NORMINV function returns the inverse 
of the normal cumulative distribution function for a given mean and standard deviation 
and is used to find the cumulative probability distribution function. The NORMINV 
function is used since the probability of success is the probability that the risk does not 
occur, or the inverse of the normal distribution for the probability of occurrence. 
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Probability Days Probability Days
0.01 222.26 0.55 431.91
0.05 280.53 0.6 442.83
0.1 311.59 0.65 454.11
0.15 332.55 0.7 466.00
0.2 349.21 0.75 478.84
0.25 363.50 0.8 493.13
0.3 376.33 0.85 509.78
0.35 388.22 0.9 530.74
0.4 399.51 0.95 561.80
0.45 410.42 0.99 620.07
0.5 421.17  
Table 9.   ISP Network Probability 
The results show that if the project is resourced for 421 days, only a 50% 
probability exists that the project is complete. Since 421 days was the expected time, or 
mean ( ), that does make sense. Given the uncertainty in the independent random 
variable that each node represents, the data also shows that if 99% chance of success is 
desired by the PM, the project would need to be resourced for 620 days, which is actually 
199 days longer than the expected project time ( ).  
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Figure 11.   ISP Network Cumulative Probability Distribution Function 
From the plot, it is easy to visualize the first 400 days of project time only yields a 
probability of success of 40 percent. An investment of an additional 93 days increases the 
probability of success to 80%, which is a typically acceptable risk in project 
management. The intent is that through visualization, the PM, MDA, and stakeholders 
can quickly understand the risk associated with a given level of resourcing for systems 
engineering documentation. From that understanding, either the risk can be accepted or 
additional action taken until the risk is of an acceptable level.  
F. SUMMARY 
“A risk may or may not happen, and you will not know for sure until the risk 
occurs, that is–until after it ceases to be a risk. This inherent uncertainty cannot be 
eliminated. However, you can often narrow the uncertainty by clarifying the probability 
of occurrence of the risk” (Smith and Merritt, 2002, p. 5). This chapter explored the 
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application of the PERT approach to quantify the risks associated with the ISP 
development and approval process. PERT was selected as the network scheduling 
approach because of the uncertainty associated with each of the activities (nodes) in the 
comprehensive project network.  
The project network and node estimates were provided by the SSC-L Architecture 
COE (June 2009). The project network is an end-to-end, or comprehensive network, that 
considers the DODAF, document assembly, and organizational, Service, and Joint review 
processes so that the risk can be quantified for the entire project, begun with the end in 
mind.  
The most likely project time, calculated using the PERT approach, was 421 days, 
with 18 of the 23 nodes (78.3%) on the critical path. The 421 days most likely, or mean 
( ) project time, is 119 days longer than the 302 day optimistic effort provided by the 
SSC-L Architecture COE. This implies that a PM who resourced the optimistic effort was 
likely to underestimate the project by four months, putting milestones and other decision 
points at significant risk. 
In fact, the cumulative probability distribution function results show that there is 
only a less than 10% probability of success for the optimistic effort, and a 50% chance of 
success for the most likely estimate. For the project to have an 80% chance of success, 
the ISP network must be resourced for 493 days, or 191 days more than the optimistic 
estimates or 72 days more than the most likely.  
The overarching intent of implementing a quantitative risk assessment approach 
for the ISP that looks at the cumulative probability distribution function is to provide a 
clear understanding, through visualization of the risks associated with the resourcing 
level of a critical systems engineering document, required by both statute and regulation. 
PMs, MDAs, and stakeholders can then either accept the risk, or take action to reduce it.  
With the risk model generated, answers to the questions posed in Chapter I can 
now be provided. Chapter VI summarizes the research and findings of this thesis, 
answers the research questions, identifies lessons learned, and provides recommendations 




A. SUMMARY OF KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Chapters I through V explored the need for risk management, the human element 
in decision making, and the quantification of risk. This chapter provides the answers to 
the research questions outlined in Chapter I, lessons learned, and recommendations for 
further research. 
The research has shown that systems engineering documentation, required by 
statute and regulation for DoD acquisition of Weapon, NSS, and IT systems, are technical 
artifacts resulting from significant technical effort and subjected to complex review and 
approval processes. The uncertainties in both efforts expose the document, and 
subsequently the program, to risks that must be effectively managed. The ISP, due to the 
significance of the document to the acquisition process and its inherent complexity, was 
the focus of the research.  
Data from the SSC-L Architecture COE (2009) showed that the effort for the ISP 
is neither properly resourced nor understood by the PM and that the document’s 
development is not managed as part of the acquisition program, but rather as a “bolt-on.” 
As of December 2008, greater than 92% of the ISPs under development for MCSC by the 
Architecture COE were late. 
At the request of the author, an end-to-end ISP project network was developed by 
the Architecture COE. From this network, the PERT approach was applied and a 
quantitative risk assessment model developed to generate a cumulative probability 
distribution function. This quantitative risk assessment approach was chosen to both 
overcome the environmental and human behavioral differences inherent in the PM and 
engineering organizations that impede communications as well as to provide a clear, 
quantified indication of risk that can either be acted upon by the PM or accepted. 
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B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Can the Risk to a Required DoD Systems Engineering Artifacts be 
Quantified? 
An end-to-end project network for the ISP, a key systems engineering document 
required by statute and regulation, was developed and a quantitative risk assessment 
performed on that comprehensive project effort. It is important to note that the 
methodology proposed in this research delivers a single quantifiable risk assessment for 
the entire ISP, inclusive of the DODAF technical work, document assembly, and local, 
Service, and Joint review and approval processes. By generating this single probability of 
success for the ISP, the risks can either be accepted or acted upon by the PM early in the 
project, during project planning activities.  
This single probability of success provides common ground for the PM and SE to 
communicate thereby bridging the frame transition issues created by differing 
perspectives researched in Chapter IV. The communication issue was verified by data 
provided by the Architecture COE and resulted in under resourced ISP efforts and 
subsequently a 92.3% late or at risk status for MCSC ISPs under development by the 
Architecture COE.  
The PERT approach for project scheduling was used for this research due to the 
uncertainty in the ISP development and approval process and the lack of historical data. 
Three estimates (best, worst, and most likely) for each activity or node were developed 
under PERT allowing the systems engineers to not feel threatened by having to provide a 
single deterministic estimate. This sensitivity to the SE’s perspective facilitates worker 
buy in, and subsequently, implementation of risk management at the lowest levels of the 
organization. As explored in Chapter III, implementation at the worker level is required 
for effective risk management. 
The cumulative probability density function, calculated from the project 
estimating, scheduling, and critical path identification PERT results, provides a clear 
visualization for the PM, MDAs, and stakeholders to see the probability of success 
(approval of the ISP) expected from the resourcing level provided by the PM. The 
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research in Chapter V shows that an 80% probability of success requires the PM to 
resource the ISP project 493 days, 119 days longer than the optimistic estimate of 302 
days. Additionally, the ISP project is extremely sensitive to the resourcing level. Should a 
PM resource the project for 400 days, less than a 19% reduction in estimated resources, 
probability of success drops to 40 percent. 
In closing, the research clearly shows that the risks can be quantified for one of 
the most complex systems engineering documents in DoD acquisition. The methodology, 
due to the end-to-end approach, also facilitates the implementation of an effective risk 
management approach for systems engineering documentation.  
2. Does the Quantification of Risk Support the Transition from the 
Rational to the Political Frame during Project Planning?  
Chapter IV research reveals that the PM and SE have different perspectives 
created by the environments in which they must operate. These frames, or lenses through 
which the world is viewed, affects decision making and ultimately problem solving. With 
the uncertainty and complexity resident in the ISP project, each organization has 
problems that must be solved. The SE have to complete difficult technical work in the 
generation of DODAF architectures or battlefield interoperability is not achieved. The 
PM must make difficult resourcing decisions in a resource-constrained environment to 
fund the technical work and must shepherd the document through the local, Service, and 
Joint review processes.  
The methodology proposed in this research delivers a quantitative risk assessment 
for the end-to-end ISP development, review, and approval process. It begins with the end 
in mind. The probability of success is calculated from the comprehensive (DODAF 
architecture development, document assembly, review and approval) project network 
resulting in a single statistically based assessment of risk that provides the common 
ground for PM and SE to communicate. Early in the project, during project planning 
when resourcing decisions are made, the PM can accept the risks associated with 
resourcing decisions and given those decisions, expectations are clear for the SE. 
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3. What Changes to the CMMI Project Planning Process Area should be 
Considered? 
The Project Planning (PP) process area has three Specific Goals (SG) and Specific 
Practices (SP) associated with each SG. As explored in Chapter IV, PP is where the 
project team gets their arms around the uncertainties and realities associated with the 
project, by establishing estimates (SG 1), developing a project plan (SG 2), and obtaining 
commitment to the plan (SG 3). Based on the research, the following changes are 
recommended for the PP process area: 
 
Specific Practice (SP) Title Recommended Change 
SP 1.1 Estimate the Scope of the 
Project 
Modify sub-practice 1; Develop a WBS 
based on the product architecture. 
Add: 
- Tasks for development of critical systems 
engineering documents or artifacts, such as 
SEP and ISP. 
SP 1.2 Establish Estimates of Work 
Product and Task Attributes 
Add new sub-practice: 
3. Estimate Effort for critical systems 
engineering documents, i.e., SEP and 
ISP. 
Estimate scope to include technical effort, 
document assembly, review and approval 
process, and comment adjudication. 
 
SP 1.4 Determine Estimates of Effort 
and Cost 
Add new sub-practice: 
4. Include critical systems engineering 
documents when estimating effort and 
cost. 
Modify sub-practice 3; Estimate effort and 
cost using models and/or historical data: 
Add: 
- Required systems engineering documents 
or artifacts 
- Review and approval process for systems 
engineering documents and artifacts 
SP 2.1 Establish the Budget and 
Schedule 
Modify 4. Identify task dependencies: 
Add:  
Include required systems engineering 
documents and artifacts when scheduling 
project tasks.  
SP 2.2 Identify Project Risks Modify 1. Identify risks: 
Add: 
Risks must be identified for the 
development, review, and approval of 
required systems engineering documents.  
Table 10.   Changes to the CMMI Project Planning Process Area 
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4. What Changes to the CMMI Risk Management Area Should be 
Considered? 
The Risk Management (RSKM) process area has three Specific Goals (SG) and 
Specific Practices (SP) associated with each SG. The CMMI (2007) risk management 
approach is consistent with the research, promoting early identification of the risks during 
project planning. Prepare for Risk Management (SG 1), Identify and Analyze Risks (SG 
2), and Mitigate Risks (SG 3) are the specific goals to achieve in this process area. Based 
on the research, the following changes are recommended for the PP process area: 
 
Specific Practice (SP) Title Recommended Change 
SP 1.1 Determine Risk Sources Add: 
- Uncertainty in technical work for 
required systems engineering documents 
and artifacts 
- Uncertainty in systems engineering 
review and approval processes. 
SP 1.3 Establish a Risk Management 
Strategy 
Modify paragraph 1: 
Change bullet 1 to read: 
The scope of the risk management effort to 
include required systems engineering 
documents and artifacts. 
 
Change bullet 3 to read: 
Project-specific sources of risks to include 
internal and external systems engineering 
documents/artifacts review and approval 
processes. 
SP 2.1 Identify Risks Modify sub-practice 1. Sentence to read: 
Schedule risks may include risks 
associated with planned activities, key 
events, and milestones to include required 
systems engineering documents/artifacts 
Add new sub-process: 
Quantify risks for required systems 
engineering documents and artifacts. 
Perform quantitative a risk assessment by 
generating a cumulative probability 
distribution function for the end-to-end 
systems engineering document effort 
inclusive of technical work, document 
assembly, and the review and approval 
process.  
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Specific Practice (SP) Title Recommended Change 
SP 2.2 Evaluate, Categorize, and 
Prioritize Risks 
Add new sub-practice:  
Evaluate probability of success for 
systems engineering documents and 
artifacts. 
Evaluate the probability of success 
expected from the planned resourcing level 
and either accept the risk or take action on 
resourcing levels.  
Table 11.   Changes to the CMMI Risk Management Area 
5. Does Inclusion of Risk Quantification into Key Systems Engineering 
Documents during Project Planning Improve the Probability of DoD 
Program Success? 
The research has established the relationship, by statute and regulation, of systems 
engineering documents to progression through the DoD acquisition framework. Directly, 
DoD weapons, and IT systems cannot progress through development and fielding without 
approval of required systems engineering documents thereby preventing capability from 
being delivered to the warfighter. Without capability delivery, the project cannot be 
successful.  
Although the improvement to the probability of program success was not 
calculated, the research shows that through the creation of an end-to-end project network, 
and calculation of a cumulative distribution function for quantitative risk assessment, for 
the first time, the risks inherent in these complex documents can be addressed early in 
project planning. With the risks understood by all, the entire project, to include required 
systems engineering documents, can now be planned and managed through milestone 
decisions and fielding to the warfighter thereby improving the chance of success: 
maintaining U.S. advantage on the battlefield. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 




 Generate comprehensive project networks for JCIDS capabilities 
documents and conduct a quantitative risk assessment. Although not the 
PM’s responsibility, these documents are very similar in both technical 
and review/approval process complexity. These documents are also 
required by statute and regulation.  
 Investigate implementation of this quantitative risk model into the 
Department of the Navy Probability of Program Success (POPs) approach 
for program health assessment 
 Investigate implementation of this quantitative risk model into the 
Department of the Defense Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition 
(August 2006) 
The complexities of developing and acquiring the weapon and IT systems needed 
for an advantage on today’s battlefield requires that all contributing organizations work 
toward a common goal. It is a human endeavor. Finding common ground that accepts the 
diverse environments in which decisions are made is critical for the DoD acquisition 
community to deliver for those who defend us. Continued research in this area, to tie 
process and decision making together, can foster the behaviors’ needed for success.  
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